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Traducir con Google Translatese abre en una pestaña nueva; solo como referenciaA key id (kid) is derived from the public key itself: the first 22 characters of the base64url SHA-256 hash of the key's crv, kty, x and y members as JSON.
| Algorithm | ES256 (ECDSA on P-256) |
Crea tu cuenta en un minuto con una passkey y luego conecta las plataformas que uses.

| Issuer | One issuer, https://id.avonao.com, signs for all seven regions |
| Custody | Each private key is stored only encrypted with AES-256-GCM, bound to its own record, under a key-encryption key that is held as a platform secret and never stored in the database. The keys are not held in a hardware security module |
| Who can sign | Only the Avonao ID sign-in service |
| Private key material | No API route returns it. The published key set holds public fields only |
| Rotation | Automatic, every 90 days |
In plain language: the sign-in service holds the keys that sign ID tokens, encrypted. No route hands them out, and only their public halves are published.
A key id (kid) is derived from the public key itself: the first 22 characters of the base64url SHA-256 hash of the key's crv, kty, x and y members as JSON. You can recompute it from the published key, so nobody can attach a different id to a key without it showing. Every ID token names its key in its header.
| Address | Content |
|---|---|
https://id.avonao.com/.well-known/jwks.json | The JWK set: public keys only, cacheable for five minutes |
https://id.avonao.com/.well-known/openid-configuration | OpenID discovery: issuer, endpoints and supported algorithms, cacheable for one hour |
https://id.avonao.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server | The same metadata in OAuth authorization server form (RFC 8414) |
For the strongest position, fetch the key set once, store each kid with its x and y values in your own repository, and verify against that copy. Refresh it when a new kid appears.
Rotation runs by itself: the active key is replaced once it is 90 days old and its successor has been published for 24 hours. A new key is published in the key set at least 24 hours before it first signs, so verifiers have it cached in time. A retired key stays published long enough for tokens signed just before the change to verify.
A compromised key can be revoked and removed from the published set at once, which makes tokens it signed stop verifying. We handle a suspected compromise as a security incident: exposed secrets are rotated, the sessions of affected accounts are ended and an affected route can be switched off. Affected people are told by email.
Report a suspected compromise to security@avonao.com.
Access to production is limited to named Avonao staff bound by confidentiality, and administrative functions need a separate token that is held as a platform secret, not in the database. Even so, the keys are not in a hardware security module, and whoever holds both the database and the key-encryption key could cause tokens to be signed. There is no key transparency log and no external audit of key handling today. Moving signing to a cloud key management service is designed, not built.
Questions: security@avonao.com.